

CS430 Concurrency: Safety

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Goals

- Define the concept of safety
- Explicit and implicit definition of safety properties
- Modelling:
 - How can safety properties be specified in FSP
 - Safety analysis using LTSA
 - Proof that our approach to locking achieves mutual exclusion

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Safety Properties

- <u>Safety properties</u> assert that nothing 'bad' will ever happen during the execution of a concurrent program
- Examples of safety properties
 - Mutual Exclusion
 - Deadlock Freedom
 - Monitor Invariants
- We are interested in
 - Do our FSP models satisfy safety properties?
 - How do we transform safe models into safe implementations?

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Safety in FSP: Property

- Safety property definition is supported by FSP
- A safety property is a process itself
- It does not include hidden actions
- *Is denoted using keyword* property
- Specifies acceptable behaviour for the process it is composed with

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Safety in FSP: Property Satisfaction

- A system S will <u>satisfy</u> a property P if S can only generate sequences of actions which when restricted to the alphabet of P, are acceptable to P.
- Example:

```
property POLITE=(knock->enter->POLITE).
HESITANT = (knock->knock->enter->HESITANT).
IMPATIANT = (enter->IMPATIANT).
||CHK_HES = (HESITANT || POLITE).
||CHK_IMP = (IMPATIANT || POLITE).
```

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
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Properties in LTS

- LTS generated for properties have
 - an additional error state (-1)
 - transitions leading to the error state for actions that would violate the property






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Exercise

■ Draw the LTS for

property FRIEND=(come->tea->leave->FRIEND).





Safety Analysis using LTSA

- We automate safety analysis using the Labelled Transition System Analyser
- LTSA can
 - compute the LTS for a safety property
 - compose the property with the process to be checked
 - If there is a trace from the initial state to the error state the system is unsafe

LTSA

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ERROR states

- Processes can be implicit properties if they use the state ERROR
- ERROR is a special state (like STOP).
- The perspective is different:
 - Properties specify desirable behaviour
 - Processes which use the ERROR state specify undesirable behaviour
- Example: mutual exclusion

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Ornamental Garden Revisited

```
const N = 2
range T = 0..N
VAR = VAR[0],
VAR[u:T] = (read[u] ->VAR[u]
            |write[v:T]->VAR[v]).
TURNSTILE = (arrive->INCREMENT
             suspend->resume->TURNSTILE),
INCREMENT = (value.read[x:T]
              ->value.write[x+1]->TURNSTILE
             )+{value.read[T],value.write[T]}.
||GARDEN = (east:TURNSTILE || west:TURNSTILE
             ||{east,west,display}::value:VAR
            )/{stop/east.suspend,
               stop/west.suspend,
               start/east.resume,
                                        LTSA
               start/west.resume \}.
                                                 10
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```

Mutual Exclusion as Safety Property

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FSP Model for Locking

```
VAR = VAR[0],
VAR[u:T]=(read[u]->VAR[u]
          write[v:T]->VAR[v]).
LOCK = (acquire->release->LOCK).
| | LOCKVAR = (LOCK | | VAR).
TURNSTILE = (arrive->INCREMENT
             suspend -> resume -> TURNSTILE),
INCREMENT = (value.acquire->value.read[x:T]
             ->value.write[x+1]
              ->value.release->TURNSTILE
             )+ {value.read[T],value.write[T]}.
||GARDEN| = (
  east:TURNSTILE || west:TURNSTILE ||
 {east,west,display}::value:LOCKVAR)
 /{stop/east.suspend,stop/west.suspend,
   start/east.resume, start/west.resume }.
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```



Safety Properties for Locking



Summary

- Introduced the concept of Safety
- Specification of Safety Properties in FSP
- Checking of Safety Properties using LTSA
- Proof of Mutual Exclusion based on Locking
- Next Session: Revision and Tutorial on Model Checking

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